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Content
【Finanical History Review】Volume 28 - Issue 2 - August 2021
April 23, 2023  

Articles

The historical dynamics of US financial exchanges

Bjørn N. Jørgensen, Kenneth A. Kavajecz, Scott N. Swisher IV

Pages 153-174

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0968565021000081

The historical dynamics of entry and exit in the financial exchange industry are analyzed for a panel of 327 US exchanges from 1855 through 2012. We focus on economic, technological and regulatory factors. Using novel panel data evidence, we empirically test whether these factors are consistent with existing financial theories. We find that US exchanges are more likely to exit per year after the passage of the Securities Exchange Act. The telephone, literacy and regulation are robust predictors of financial exchange dynamics, whereby an upward trend in literacy is an important driver of exchange entry.


International banking and financial fragility: the role of regulation in Brazil and Mexico, 1967–1982

Sebastian Alvarez

Pages 175-204

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0968565021000044

The shortcomings and potential dangers of international financial flows for the health and stability of domestic banking systems in developing countries have been copiously discussed over the last decades. While the importance of capital controls and regulation as determining factors has been widely emphasised, the extent to which these policies work in episodes of financial crisis is still a matter of debate. This article examines the relationship between supervisory frameworks and banking fragility in Mexico and Brazil in the wake of the international debt crisis of 1982. It shows that the model of international banking intermediation that evolved out of the stringent capital mobility system in Brazil was considerably less vulnerable to crisis than in Mexico, which had a more lightly regulated regime. These findings provide insights into historical debates about the implications of prudential regulation and capital controls for the development and expansion of foreign finance, and whether the risks underlying international banking are necessarily inherent in the process of financial globalisation.


Friends or foes? Brazil, the IMF and the World Bank, 1961–1967

Carlo Edoardo Altamura, Claudia Kedar

Pages 205-236

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S096856502100007X

Between June 1959 and March 1964, the democratic governments of Brazilian presidents Juscelino Kubitschek (January 1956 – January 1961), Janio Quadros (January–August 1961), Ranieri Mazzilli (August–September 1961) and João ‘Jango’ Goulart (September 1961 – April 1964) received no support from the World Bank (WB), which refused to fund even a single new project during this period. During this same period, and, more specifically, between July 1958 and January 1965, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the WB's twin institution, granted financial assistance to Brazil only twice: a controversial and highly conditional Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) signed in May 1961; and a non-conditional and automatically approved Compensatory Financial Facility (CFF), granted in May 1963 to compensate Brazil for the decrease in coffee prices on the international market.


This attitude towards Brazil changed significantly following the military coup of March 1964. Money flowed into the country and by 1970 Brazil had become the largest receiver of WB funds and a chronic borrower from the IMF, signing two SBAs in 1965, and one per year between 1966 and 1972. We use recently disclosed material from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank archives to analyse the relationship of these two institutions with Brazil and to foster the debate on their political neutrality, arguing that the difference in the IMF's and especially the WB's relations with the military regime reflected, more than anything else, the existence of an ideological affinity between the parties with regards to the ‘right’ economic policy.


Effects of credit restrictions in the Netherlands on credit growth and inflation

Gabriele Galati, Jan Kakes, Richhild Moessner

Pages 237-258

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0968565021000093

Credit restrictions were used as a monetary policy instrument in the Netherlands from the 1960s to the early 1990s. Since these restrictions were aimed at containing money rather than credit growth, their focus was on net credit creation by the financial sector. We document the rationale of these credit restrictions and how their implementation evolved in line with the evolution of the financial system. We study the impact on the balance sheet structure of banks and other financial institutions. We find that banks mainly responded to credit restrictions by making adjustments to the liability side of their balance sheets, particularly by increasing the proportion of long-term funding. Responses on the asset side were limited, while part of the banking sector even increased lending after the adoption of a restriction. These results suggest that banks and financial institutions responded by switching to long-term funding to meet the restriction and shield their lending business. Arguably, the credit restrictions were therefore still effective in reaching their main goal. Indeed, we do find evidence of a significant effect of credit restrictions on inflation.


The French bonds: the little-known bidding war for France's holdings in American debt, 1786–1790

Peter Theodore Veru

Pages 259-280

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S096856502100010X

In 1786, the Van Staphorst brothers, America's Dutch investment bank, entered the French office of the Director General of Finance, intent on making an offer for a portion of France's holdings of American bonds. Unknowingly, their offer set off a bidding war that could have ended with poorly capitalized American financial adventurers owing a large portion of bonds which could threaten the fragile health of American credit. At the eleventh hour, the Van Staphorsts conjured up a bold, unprecedented, scheme to persuade the French that it would be unnecessary to sell their American bonds at discounted prices.


   

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